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THE URBAN RESPONSE TO THE RURAL LAND REFORM 
MOVEMENT DURING THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR: 1945-1949 
By: Elizabeth Grad 
1 
•
 
Introduction 
China's internal condition immediately following the end of Japanese occupation 
was complicated and precarious. The conflicting interests of the Kuomintang and the 
Communists were pushing the nation into civil war and pressure from the United States 
only hastened the collapse ofan already weak: internal structure. The Japanese occupation 
of China during the war had significant implications and affected the political fortunes of 
the Kuomintang and the Communists in diverse ways. 
Initially, the War ofResistance against Japan promoted nationalism and Chiang 
Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists united for the good of the nation. l This unity, 
however, was short lived and the two political factions were never able to compromise on 
a political policy that would unify and help to democratize modem China. Ambitious in 
their goals and equipped with strong leadership, the Communists chose to pursue a path 
of resistance, as well as one of social revolution. The opportunity to utilize the incursion 
of the Japanese began in north China. Experienced with guerilla warfare, the Comm~nists 
were able to organize a resistance movement in the countryside behind enemy lines. As a 
result of their mobilization and effective use of the rural masses by the end of the World 
War II the Communists could claim control of an area occupied by nearly 95 million 
people. 
Conversely, the Kuomintang was not able to organize an effective resistance 
movement against the Japanese. Plagued by corruption, weak leadership, and a growing 
sense ofpopular discontent, the Nationalist government was unable to find unity in the 
face ofviolent Japanese aggression. The Kuomintang chose to pursue a path of 
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resistance to Japanese invasion without addressing the social and economic needs of the 
vast majority of the Chinese people? Despite the Kuomintang's ineffectiveness in terms 
of addressing the needs of the people, Chiang and his government were heralded as 
national heroes when the defeat of the Japanese was secured in August 1945. It was 
following the war of resistance and upon the government's attempt to solidify its power 
that opposition to the Kuomintang grew. The opposition's voice became more 
predominant and contributed to their unpopularity and difficulty in maintaining support. 
The defeat of the Japanese in 1945 was pivotal; initially, it meant a resounding 
faith in the Kuomintang. However, the policies pursued by the government in the 
immediate post-war months led to a rapid dissipation of popular support. Chiang Kai­
shek and the Nationalists were faced with the paramount task of reconversion of enemy 
occupied territories and addressing the demands of two distinct sectors of the nation, the 
urban and the rural masses. 
The government takeover of enemy institutions and territory was imbued with 
corruption and public disapproval from the outset. Suzanne Pepper notes in her 
comprehensive study of the Chinese civil war that "just as the Government offered no 
authoritative procedures for resolving fairly the issue of [enemy] collaboration, so also it 
lSuzanne Pepper, Civil War in China, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 
Inc., 1999), 7. 
2In Mao Tse-Tung's essay "On Coalition Government" he quotes the Kuomintang as 
advocating a theory that when "confronted with a formidable enemy, we should not talk 
about Democracy or the people's welfare; we had better wait until the Japanese are gone" 
(as stated in "On Coalition Government" in Selected Works ofMao Tse-Tung, Vol. 4, 
[New York: International Publishers, 1956], 293). He goes on to stress that socially "the 
points of controversy between the two parties really hinges on the issue of agrarian 
relationships" (294). This theory will playa significant role in the analysis ofthe 
response generated by the Kuomintang land policies and subsequent claims of 
government inadequacies. 
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failed to provide any equitable and orderly means for disposing of enemy property.''' 
Weak policies and contradicting actions in the takeover process only strengthened 
popular disapproval of government policies.4 The economy also suffered and the 
government's failure to minimize the financial consequences caused by the war's end 
only furthered the disintegration ofNationalist rule. 
In addition to the political barriers between the Nationalists and the Communists 
parties another facet of China's political spectra, the middle forces, began to voice their 
opinions concerning the welfare and the future of China. In terms of exercising political 
power the middle forces played a negligible role; however, their influence and 
prominence as the deciding element in who would prevail in the Kuomintang and 
Communist disputes was monumental. The middle forces, which were comprised of 
businessmen, intellectuals, students and professionals, wielded a significant amount of 
power in terms of influencing public opinion and securing the political power of either of 
the two preeminent political parties. Ultimately, they would be of vital importance to the 
Communists in terms securing a base of support in the cities, and their response to land 
reform was significant in that it undercut the authority of the Kuomintang government. 
The Communist alternative to the Kuomintang response to China's internal 
struggles focused around organizing and addressing the needs of the masses. The 
ideology of the Communists coalesced around the ultimate aim of social revolution with 
3 Pepper, 16. 
4 A thorough account of the confused and corrupt practices of the Kuomintang during the 
period immediately following the defeat of the Japanese can be found in Suzanne 
Pepper's text, Civil War in China. Ofparticular interest is the account of reconversion of 
enemy properties in Shanghai. 
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power in the hands of the workers and support from the rural masses.5 As noted earlier, 
the initial strategy ofthe Communists in the War ofResistance against Japan was to 
mobilize the countryside to fight the Japanese, while pursuing a policy of social reform. 
The Communists, unlike the Government, were able to increase their strength amongst 
the peasants while fighting the war. Utilizing the war as a base to broaden their popular 
support, the Communists success can be attributed to "their social and economic policies; 
the relative competence and integrity with which those policies were being implemented; 
and the discipline of the Communist armies.',6 The most significant and revolutionary of 
the policies pursued by the Communists during the civil war years was that of land 
reform. 
Land reform was the key element ofone of the greatest social revolutions in 
history, the Chinese Civil War. As early as 1927, Communist leader Mao Tse-tung was 
calling for a peasant movement to overthrow the feudal agrarian elements of rural 
society. In Mao's essay, "Investigation into Peasant Movement in Hunan," he noted that 
"the peasants attack as their main targets the local bullies and bad gentry and the lawless 
landlords, hitting in passing against patriarchal ideologies and institutions, corrupt 
officials in the cities and evil customs in the rural areas."? But while addressing the 
needs of the peasantry, the Communists faced the same task ofpacifying the cities as did 
the Kuomintang forces. In terms of furthering its agrarian policy of rural land reform 
while maintaining neutrality and winning the support of the urban middle forces the 
5 James Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History 1912­

1949, (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 148.
 
6 Pepper, 201.
 
7 Mao Tse-tung, "Investigation into Peasant Movement in Hunan," Selected Works, (New
 
York: International Publishers, 1954), 1:23.
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"correct political line was not capitulation, but rather 'developing the progressive forces, 
winning over the middle forces and isolating the diehards.',s The Communist Party would 
not surrender to political ideologies other than its own, and to achieve its aim of a 
socialist revolution the Party sought to incorporate the politics of the middle forces with 
its own. An analysis of the urban response to rural land reform is possible through the 
examination of articles that appeared in the urban press, the official writings of 
Kuomintang, Communist, and third party officials, and other primary documents during 
the period of the civil war (1945-1949). 
An examination of existing documents from the time period leads one to conclude 
that each political party politicized the land reform movement to put forth its own agenda 
and adapted the land reform movement to sustain each of the parties own identities and 
strive for internal peace. The magnitude of the concept of land reform and the complete 
overhaul of an agrarian system, which had existed for nearly two thousand years, was 
bound to bring significant changes across political, social, and cultural fronts. The 
actualization of land reform and the implementation of rural land policies by the Chinese 
Communist Party sparked a vigorous response across all fronts; within the media of the 
time emerged a consensus of opinion that land reform was necessary. The argument thus 
became one of a political nature and mirrored a convergence of ideas as to whether the 
reality ofland reform could be accomplished; in its wake the question emerged as to 
which political agenda would ultimately prevail. One can trace the evolution of land 
8 Thomas Lutze, "The Battle for the Middle Forces: United States Relations with the 
Chinese Communist Party, 1947-1948" (Master of Arts thesis, University of Wisconsin, 
1989),42-3. 
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6 
refonn through the urban responses and see how ultimately the Communist policies 
succeeded in winning the revolution and the support of the urban middle forces. 
Dr. Sun Vat-sen and Land to the Tiller 
Before examining the Communist approach to land refonn it is important to 
provide an overview of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and the impact 
that his call for "land to the tiller" would have on the concept of land refonn. Dr. Sun 
Vat-sen was a Nationalist and founder of the Chinese Republic. He promoted the initial 
calls for revolution in the early 1900's and was dedicated to eliminating the threat of 
imperialism and the corruption ofChinese government. Revolution gained more support 
following the Boxer Rebellion and in 1911 when the city ofHupeh fell to the 
Revolutionists the defeat of the Manchu government would follow in only one hundred 
days. Sun's initial goal of a revolutionary take over of the government had been 
accomplished. Following the revolution, Sun chose to "devote himself to the task of 
educating the people to an understanding of the fundamentals of democracy.'ll 
Unfortunately, Sun's aims would be superceded by the government and policies ofYuan 
Shih-kai and the completion of the revolution was postponed until Chiang Kai-shek 
assumed power in 1926. 
It would be a mistake to assume that Sun's years of study and promulgation of his 
democratic ideologies were wasted following the revolution and its subsequent 
dissipation. Sun's Three Principles of the People "constitute the basic ideals and policies 
of the [nationalist] Revolutionary movement."lO Significant to the topic of this paper and 
9 Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles ofthe People, (Republic of China: 
China Publishing CO., n.d.), vi. 
lOIb'd ...1 ., Vlll. 
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the ultimate basis for land reform policies on both the Communist and Nationalist sides 
were Sun's ideas concerning land reform. 
One of the main goals of the Three Principles of the People was to accomplish 
land reform. Sun commented that "[t]he process of social change...begins with the 
landowners." and although China broke away from the feudal system, "because of the 
lack of industrial and commercial progress, social conditions are," just about the same as 
they were in the feudal era. I I Sun continued by stressing that the "plan which we are 
following is simple and easy-the equalization oflandownership.,,12 By having the 
government take back the land redistribute it Sun gave credence to his slogan land to the 
tillers. Based on this concept the Communist embarked upon a land reform movement 
that would playa significant role in China's social revolution. The Kuomintang would 
also boast its adherence to Sun's principles, although in practice and ideology Chiang 
Kai-shek differed substantially from his predecessor, Sun Yat-sen. 
The Communists and Land Reform 
The most significant advancements in the revolution were the land reform policies 
ofthe Communist Party. Mao Tse-tung and the Communists sought to unify the masses, 
beginning with the peasants and then form a united front with the urban workers. 
The complexities of the land reform movement, however, are substantial and it is 
important to examine the process involved in implementing the rural land policies. To 
fully understand the character of the rural land reform movement one must examine the 
Communist's approach during the Japanese occupation and leading up to the Party's 
policies during the Civil War. 
llIbid., 173. 
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basic components. The landlord class comprised the highest strata of rural society. 
Landlords owned the land, did not work in the fields, and relied upon hired labor. Rent 
and interest collection were the landlords main sources of income. Rich peasants worked 
in their fields, but were fortunate enough to have surplus property, implements, and 
income. Often rich peasants employed hired labor, collected rents and profited from 
interest on loans they had issued. The middle peasants worked their own land and made 
enough to sustain an average standard of living. Some middle peasants were able to use 
hired labor, although often times they did so only during the busy times of year. Poor 
peasants owned only a small plot of land and often no farming implements. Poor peasants 
took out loans and paid rent to the landlords and rich peasants; often they had to hire 
themselves out as laborers. Hired labor completed the five basic divisions in China's 
feudal rural society. Hired workers owned no land or implements and relied on selling 
their labor power to maintain a living.13 
There were significant differences between the distribution of land and wealth 
between landlords and poor peasants and one can assume that the circumstances also 
varied across the many faceted regions ofChina. It is within this framework and during 
the war of resistance against Japan that the Communist Party chose to pursue a 
"moderate" program ofrent and interest reduction and progressive taxation. 
Acknowledging that the conditions facing the rural areas in China were not universal, the 
wartime policies of the Communists focused on weakening the feudal elites. If the 
12Ibid., 177.
 
13 Thomas Lutze, Class Lecture, (History 300 Modem China: Illinois Wesleyan
 
University, Bloomington, IL, March 9,2001).
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ultimate goal of destroying feudalism was to be realized the Communist Party had to 
pursue a more rigorous course of action. The end World War II and the subsequent 
reaction of the rural masses, in particular the poor peasants, would serve as the base form 
which the Party was able to implement the first of a series ofmore thorough land reform 
methods. 
The tensions between landlords and their tenants were at an extreme in 1945. Pei 
Xiaotong, a non-Communist anthropoligist, keenly observed that 
those in the landlord class who have been depending upon income from 
rents must sooner or later be eliminated. Landlords who themselves cannot 
cultivate the land can only rent their land out to others. Yet this piece of 
land will not feed both the landlord and the tenant at one and the same 
time. The landlord cannot find a way to eliminate the tenant and get 
income... [and] the tenant can cultivate the land without the assistance of 
the landlord. 14 
Pei's description was accurate and the Communists realized the volatile nature of 
class conflict in the rural regions that he referred to. The Communist Party was 
reluctant to disregard its previous policy of rent and interest reduction in favor of 
outright confiscation oflandlord's property, however. The exhausted state of the 
people following the defeat of the Japanese indicated apathy towards war and 
violence. If the Communists were to seize landlords' holdings and foster conflict 
with the Nationalists, they risked losing the support ofthe middle forces that 
desired peace. The Communist Party thus decided to pursue its wartime rural 
policy of rent and interest reduction. Mao continued to emphasize uniting the 
14Pei Xiaotong, China's Gentry, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 119. Pei 
will be discussed in greater detail later on in the paper. His observations are significant 
in that he represents a voice of the middle forces. 
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masses in a vigorous campaign against the landlord class stressing that rent and 
interest reduction must be pursued with sincerity and support. Interesting to note, 
however, is that Mao also acknowledged "this movement would surely involve 
excesses...but as long as the excesses resulted from genuine mass struggle, they 
could be corrected later.,,15 Mao's mention of excesses stems from the fact that 
peasants had already begun to seize land; the class conflict had boiled over into 
open aggression. 
The defeat of the Japanese created a struggle for local power. Many local 
officials had collaborated with the Japanese and when Japanese withdrew they 
abandoned their offices. The peasants spontaneously attacked those remaining 
traitors, many of whom were also landlords. In addition to anti-traitor sentiments, 
the areas that had been liberated from the Japanese earlier in the year called for 
"the consolidation and development of the fruits of the wartime rent and interest 
reduction campaigns.,,16 The Communist Party chose to respond to the peasants 
needs with a directive in December of 1945. In the old liberated areas the 
directive that called upon officials to re-examine the rent and interest reduction 
campaign and increase production. In the newly liberated areas the Party wanted 
the masses to launch an anti-traitor campaign, the settling of 
accounts movement and rent reduction. Settling of accounts itemized each grievance 
against a landlord and sought compensation for the landlord's exploitation. The campaign 
in the newly liberated areas was known as the speak bitterness campaign and in certain 
15Thomas Lutze, "China's New Democratic Revolution: Complexities of the Anti-Fuedal 
Struggle 1945-1949," (Houston, Texas: Southwest Conference of Asian Studies, October 
2000),9. 
11 
•
 
areas the settling of accounts resulted in the equal distribution of land and an end to the 
land problem. 
The campaign, however, was not without its faults. Often times it was hard to 
convince the villagers to initiate the speak: bitterness movement. Cadres had to convince 
the peasants that they should reconsider their fears and trust the effectiveness of the new 
campaign. When the peasants were finally persuaded to speak:, the cadres were 
confronted with yet another challenge. It was difficult to distinguish between who was 
and was not a traitor. Traitors were often the landlord's assistants and the elites had 
commissioned them to serve in the Japanese puppet governments. These assistants 
became the instrument through which anti-resistance campaigns were organized and 
resources for the Japanese troops were gathered. Thus it became obvious that the first 
recipients of the peasant's anger during the Anti-Traitor and speak bitterness campaign 
would be these assistants. Ultimately, the Party would promote condemning the assistants 
for their actions and stress that the real blame should be placed on the landlords that . 
forced them to collaborate with the Japanese. 
Despite the often violent and excessive actions of the poor peasants the new 
campaigns were successful in acknowledging the extent of landlord exploitation and the 
resentment that had grown amongst the peasants. As the misdeeds of the landlords 
became public knowledge so to did the realization that the peasants' civil and moral 
rights had been violated. The peasant vigorously pursued the policy of "settling 
accounts." The landlords faced criticism from multiple peasants; soon their "accounts" 
owed to peasants exceeded their assets and "land was thus confiscated, not as policy, but 
16Ibid., 10. 
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as payment for debt.,,17 The concept land to the tiller was being realized through the 
actions of the masses. 
Under this premise, the Communist Party embarked upon a revision of the rural 
land system. As the peasants demanded land, the Communist Central Committee decided 
to alter its previous wartime policy of rent and interest reduction, and address the 
peasants demand for land that had become apparent in rural movements. The party's 
goals are clearly outlined in the 1946 publication ofLiu Shaoqui"s "Directive on the 
Land Question" generally known as the May 4th Directive. Liu details eighteen points 
through which the land reform policies were to be carried out. 
The directive calls for the Party to "firmly support the demands of the masses as 
they realize the principle of 'land to the tiller' by taking land from the landlords." IS 
Confiscation and redistribution ofland would be formally organized and implemented by 
the Party. Only the land of collaborators was subject to confiscation; other measures were 
adopted to deal with non-traitor landlords There were four other methods of land reform 
that were being simultaneously conducted in 1946 by the Communist Party. Suzanne 
Pepper outlines them as: 
(1) direct confiscation applied primarily to the property of Japanese and 
their collaborators, but also to black lands and land acquired through 
mortgage foreclosures; (2) the sale of landlord holdings to tenants and 
others; (3) a land contribution movement; and (4) the equal redivision 
of village land and property.19 
17Ibid., 12. 
IS Liu Shaoqi, "Directive on the Land Question," Selected Works ofLiu Shaoqi, (Beijing: 
Foreign Language Press, 1984),373. 
19 Pepper, 277. 
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It was under these guidelines that the party instituted its rural land policies in the 
liberated areas. 
In areas were the Communist Party had not secured control, the wartime policy of 
rent and interest reduction was the only policy that was carried out. The Party's policy in 
the non-secured areas was deeply entrenched in their belief that the middle peasants 
should not become targets of the land reform movement. The Directive called for Cadres 
to give "proper consideration...to the livelihood of middle and small landlords," they 
were to be treated differently from "big landlords, evil gentry and local tyrants.'~o 
Communist policy ofmaintaining the support the middle forces was largely tied into their 
efforts to always consider the needs of the middle and rich peasants. The Directive 
stresses the need to bring the middle peasants into the struggle and not alienate their 
interests. According to the directive, "[s]olving the land problem in the Liberated Areas 
with a population of over 100 million will help substantially to consolidate these areas 
and promote the nationwide movement towards democratization.'.21 
The land reform policies of the Communists continued to vary even with the 
pronouncement of the May 4 Directive. Once again the varying condition from region to 
region affected the policies implementation. In old liberated areas there were no more 
collaborators and in some cases land had already been redistributed. In addition to the 
varying conditions regionally, within each region differences arose amongst Party 
officials concerning how to interpret and implement the seemingly "please all" directive. 
It is within this context that what became know as "rightist" deviations appeared. 
20 Liu Shaoqui. 372. 
17 Ibid., 377. 
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Cadres were accustomed to the rent and interest reduction campaign and were slow to 
understand and adopt the new policy. Others were fearful ofNationalist attacks and the 
repercussions ofgovernment victory. Still others were confronted with personal 
conflicts; some cadres were from landlord and rich peasant background and had become 
cadres to preserve their family's interests. 
Conversely, there were cadres who energetically engaged in land redistribution 
and found that there was not enough land to give to the poor peasants. As a result a series 
of gaps existed in the distribution process. Compounding the growing inequality was the 
armed and often violent opposition of landlords to the new policies. Reports of cadres 
being murdered by landlords became more prevalent and subsequently evoked a stronger 
response amongst the peasants. Some cadres were criticized for siding to strongly with 
the "peasant line." Deviating from the Party's aim ofuniting with the middle peasants 
and neutralizing the rich peasants, brought with it more violence and potential for 
threatening the Communist's support in the countryside. The middle peasants, and on a 
lesser scale, the rich peasants, played a significant role in ensuring the success of land 
reform. The "leftist" deviations of energetic cadres proved to be a significant concern of 
the Party and threatened to jeopardize the success of the land reform movement. 
Ultimately, the policies set forth in the May 4th Directive were aimed at 
destroying the existing patterns of land tenure and transfer of the ownership of land to the 
peasants who tilled it. Initial urban responses to this directive were limited. An editorial 
comment published in the Sin Wen Pao claimed that "Nationalist troops have recently 
captured an important secret Communists document. .. [t]his document was a directive 
15 
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concerning the land revolution.',z2 The article went on to outline the policy set forth in 
the Communist's directive. The editorial quoted Dr. Phillip Fu, aide to U.S. Ambassador 
John Leighton Stuart, who claimed that the "matter of unifying the land system in China 
should be the problem that should first be solved.... The differences between these two 
parties are due to this fundamental problem.',z3 The article outlined the government's 
approach to land reform as that which is advocated in the "Principles of the People's 
livelihood of the Three People's Principles" and also the Kuomintang's adaptation of the 
land policy advocating "land to those who till it.,,24 The article calls upon the government 
to reform the land system and warns that if it is not accomplished "it will greatly affect 
the ruling power of the Kuomintang.',z5 This initial realization by the Nationalist 
government that land reform was the key to winning the revolution and sustaining 
political power came at a time when the Communists were already strengthening their 
base of support by means of a land revolution. Further reports indicated a variety of 
measures were taken to promote land reform as the answer to domestic strife. A news 
extract from the Communist New China News Agency in Peiping reported that in areas 
were land reform had been accomplished "the Communists Northeastern Administrative 
Committee approved a 4,500,000,000 farm loan...and the principle work of the 
Commission" was to lead an agricultural production campaign.26 
In December of 1946 another article appeared in the Communist New China 
22 Sin Wen Paa, "Reform of Land System," Shanghai, September 4, 1946 (CPR).
 
23Ibid.
 
24Ibid.
 
25Ibid.
 
2~ew China News Agency, "Communist Northeast Commission Approves Farm Loan,"
 
Peiping, December 21,1946 (CPR).
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News Agency (Peiping). The article, "Communists Enforce Land Reform Through 
Purchasing of Landlords' Land," indicated that the Communist's multi-faceted policy 
was successful. Landlord Tang Shen-kun was quoted in the article as being "very 
satisfied with issuance ofpublic bonds which helped the poor to purchase land...and 
made compensations for the landlord.'.27 The other forms of land reform, including the 
sale of landlords' holdings, were merely experimental policies aimed at devising a system 
ofuniform land reform measures. These measures also played a significant role in the 
Communist Party's defense strategy. Mao declared in October 1946 in his essay "A 
Three Months' Summary" that: 
The experience of these three months had proved that the peasants stood 
with our Party and our army against the attacks ofChiang Kai-shek's 
troops wherever the Central Committee's directive ofMay 4 was carried 
out firmly and speedily and the land problem was solved radically and 
thoroughly. The peasants took a wait-and-see attitude wherever the "May 
4th Directive" was not carried out firmly or the arrangements were made 
too late, or wherever this work was mechanically divided into stages or 
land reform was neglected on the excuse ofpreoccupation with the war. 
In the coming few months all areas, no matter how busy they are with the 
war, must resolutely lead the peasant masses to solve the land problem, 
and on the basis of the land reform, make arrangements for large-scale 
production work next year?8 
Mao was accurate in his assessment of the peasants support for the Communists land 
reform policies. The settling of accounts that occurred shortly after the war was generally 
followed by efforts to redistribute the land and property and eventually culminated in the 
Party's formal policy as set forth in the Outline Agrarian Law. 
The CCP Central Committee issued a formal directive on October 10, 1947. The 
Outline Agrarian Law authorized a systematic land reform program aimed at completely 
27New China News Agency, no title given, Peiping, December 26, 1946 (CPR). 
28 Mao Tse-tung, "A Three Months' Summary," Selected Works, 4: 116. 
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abolishing the landlord class and equalizing land ownership. The Law provided a definite 
set ofprinciples to guide the expropriation and redistribution of land. According to Mao, 
the new law reaffirmed the principles of the May 4th Directive, but also "explicitly 
corrected a certain lack of thoroughness in that directive.'''9 The lack ofthoroughness 
stems from the directives "please all" approach and the excesses that were generated as a 
- result of implementing the directives policies. 
The 1947 document is revolutionary in that it calls for the elimination of 
landlordism rather than just the abolition of landownership. The significant points of the 
Law include: (1) Abolition oflandownership rights oflandlords; (2) Cancellation of all 
debts incurred in rural areas prior to present agrarian reform; (3) Abolition of 
landownership rights of all ancestral shrines, temples, schools and other corporate 
entities; (4) Equalized redistribution of all landlords' land, livestock, agricultural 
implements, houses and grain to those who till; (5) Allotment ofland to landlords, 
Kuomintang government and army officers and men and their relatives (excluding 
traitors and war criminals) on an equal basis with the peasants; (6) Grant of land deeds to 
individuals; (7) Free management of the land allotted to each individual; (8) 
Establishment of hsiang (large group ofvillages) as the unit for land redistribution; (9) 
Execution of the reforms by village peasant associations, and committees elected by them 
and by peasant congresses; (10) Establishment ofpeople's tribunals composed of 
peasants' representatives and government appointees to punish any who violate the Law; 
(11) Exemption ofmerchants' and manufacturers' properties and enterprises from 
29 Mao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," Selected Works, 4: 164. 
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redistribution.3o Unique to the Law was the realization that local conditions varied across 
China and to accomplish any sort of national overhaul of the land system the Party gave 
broad powers to locally elected peasant associations and governments. 
Frank C. Lee, a non-Communist Chinese journalist, published an article 
immediately following the promulgation of the Draft Agrarian Law. He noted that a 
report on the success of the Law was premature, however, "a briefreview of the agrarian 
reforms that have already taken place in the Communist dominated areas indicates that 
most of the measures in the program had been initiated months before it was announced 
in its present form.,,3! Lee solidified the Party's concern over the spontaneous 
movement to settle accounts that had begun with the end of World War II. Peasants 
confronted local landlords, many of whom collaborated with the Japanese, and sought 
revenge. The Communists were able to use the Japanese incursion and formulate a 
realistic program and strong leadership base to support the desires of the peasants. 
William Hinton gives an excellent summation of the rural land reform movement and the 
rural response in his text Fanshen.32 
The urban response to the 1946-1947 land reform policies indicated a general 
30 The summary of the Outline Agrarian Law was drawn from the Basic Program of the 
Chinese Agrarian Law, passed by the nationwide Agrarian Conference of the Chinese 
Communist Party, September 13, 1947. The Law was publicly issued on October 10, 
1947. 
3! Frank C. Lee, "Land Redistribution in Communist China" Pacific Affairs, Vol. 21, 
No.1, (1948), Pacific Affairs University ofBritish Columbia, Database online, Available 
from JSTOR, 22. 
32William Hinton's Fanshen, an account of revolution in a rural Chinese village, has 
become an essential tool for analyzing the effects of civil war in the Chinese countryside. 
The in-depth analysis of the mobilization ofpeasants under the Communist line and the 
subsequent organization of rural class struggle are set in the context of the events that 
occurred in Long Bow village. Hinton's portrayal of the rural situation in Communist 
liberated areas is essential to grasping the magnitude of Communist land reform policies. 
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approval for the Communists policies. An article published in March of 1946 indicated 
that "after the Communists explained to them that they are asked to observe the 
Communist policy of reducing the land interests, etc. It was reported that satisfactory 
results have been obtained by all who have applied.'''3 These successes were reported 
before the formal promulgation of the Outline Agrarian Law. 
A negative review of the Communist land reform movement was issued in a 
November 1947 publication of the Hua Pei Jih Pao, a KMT newspaper. 34 The article 
claimed that the first task of the Communists "was massacring and looting...next, the 
Communists dealt with the so-called wealthy people... [and] it is said that next the 
Communists would deal with the womenfolks.',35 This is the only instance were it is 
suggested the reform efforts by the Communists weren't taking place at all. Rather, 
according to the Kuomintang, the Communists were merely slaughtering the people. A 
pro-Communist radio broadcast made from the Communist Hsin Hua station in 
December of 1947 indicates that the Communists protected the peasants from hostile 
activities and those specifically anti-revolutionary in nature. The article noted that the 
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei people's liberated area promulgated an 
order...accepting the 'Fundamental Principles of the Chinese Land Law' 
as the Land Law of the border area...ajoint proclamation, strictly 
prohibit[ed] all anti-revolutionary acts tending to destroy land reforms and 
guaranteein~ the farmers in the border area to thoroughly rehabilitate 
themselves. 6 
33 Ta Kung Pao, "Refugees Returning to Communists Areas," Peiping, March 23, 1946 
(CPR). 
34 The translator of this particular article notes in parentheses that the article is a 
KMT/MOlorgan. 
35 Hua Pei Jih Pao (KMT MOl), "Refugees from Shihchiachuang," Peiping, November 
30, 1947 (CPR). Actually printed on December 3, 1947 
36U.S. Consulate, Peiping, China, Translations Radio Broadcasts ofCommunist Hsin 
Hua Station, North Shensi, December 1, 1947. 
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Overall, the initial efforts at land reform were covered in the press because of the radical 
social revolution that they sparked. Reports of the success of the land reform movement 
failed to indicate, however, the excesses and errors that grew out of the same movement. 
Party directives and the attitudes of cadres and peasants were often in conflict. 
Communist officials had hoped that by actively answering the rural demands of the 
peasants that the masses would support the Communists and form the backbone of the 
Communist's rural army, ultimately to unite and support the proletariat. This support did 
not come as easily as the CCP officials had hoped. Suzanne Pepper offers four reasons 
for the reluctance of the peasants to participate and the challenges faced by the cadres in 
addressing the needs of the people and maintaining their support. 
Pepper first notes that the peasants were not willing to leave neither their newly 
gained land nor their families to participate in the war against the government. Their 
reluctance to join the Red Army was compounded by the increase in attacks by 
Kuomintang forces in the liberated areas. The peasants had a genuine fear of losing their 
land and more significantly their lives if the government were to successfully defeat the 
Communists. Finally, the cadres lacked understanding of the Party's intentions and thus 
the ability to resolutely dedicate themselves to the tumultuous rural situation?7 The 
cadres saw land reform in a much different light then their superior Party officials. 
Cadres faced a dual dilemma in that most of them were of landlord or gentry class origin 
and had never entertained the thought of destroying feudalism, let alone distributing land 
to the poor peasants. Cadres also "recalled that landlords had helped them during the anti­
37 Pepper, 293. 
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Japanese resistance...the old cadres entertained no genuine class hatred.'''8 The political 
line of the Party, to evoke mass resistance against the oppression of feudalism with the 
ultimate goal of a socialist revolution, was misunderstood, and the significance of the 
peasant movement in defeating the Kuomintang not considered 
The Party needed to clarify its intentions and the cadres had to overcome their 
own doubts and "make the peasants understand that they would be able to keep their land 
only if they were willing to fight for it.,,39 The Party also had to acknowledge that they 
suffered from a loss ofmilitary security both within the liberated areas where land reform 
had been carried out and in the areas were land reform had not been accomplished. In the 
areas were land reform was in progress the Communists created their own enemy within, 
the landlords. The threat created by the landlord class was one of the motivations behind 
the radical and often excessive attempts to carry out land reform. The second threat came 
largely from Kuomintang advances against Communist liberated areas. 
The conflict in this case was two fold. Militarily, in the face ofKMT aggression, 
the Communists choose to adopt a policy ofwithdrawal rather than confronting a 
superior military force. The retreat policy forced the peasants to submit to government 
forces. The peasants became disillusioned and "were reluctant to restore the peasant 
associations, or to form new militia units, or even to attend an open meeting, so little faith 
did they have in the staying power of the Communists.,,4o The preeminent fear of the 
peasants concerning the possibility of government revenge contributed to the low morale 
of the peasants in regards to Communists victory and their role in the struggle. In areas 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 295. 
40Pepper. 303. 
22 
•
 
were land reform had not been carried out the Communists had no base from which to 
draw support.41 
To combat the potentially fatal implications oflosing peasant support, the 
Communists abandoned their policy of retreat and returned to a military strategy that had 
served their needs in the past, guerilla warfare. Not only did the party advocate guerilla 
warfare, they also called for the simultaneous carrying out of land reform. 
A pro-Communist urban response to land reform, with a particular concentration 
on the print news media, was almost non-existent. A radical upheaval was taking place 
in the countryside, compounded by a savage civil war, famine, and near economic 
collapse and there was scant attention paid to these issues by some of the most prominent 
news organs. 42 The few articles pertaining to land reform and indirectly the policies of 
the Communists were appeals to "[refrain] from adding to the burden of the 
farmers ... [and] to confiscate the wealth of those who got rich because of excessive 
profits.,,43 An editorial published in the Wen Hui Pao in Shanghai in July of 1946 
suggests that the Communists reform policies may be the right answer, but ultimately the 
correct policies need to come from a unified government. The author called for a careful 
examination of "the political and economic systems in the CP-controlled areas to see if 
they are more sound and more progressive...so as to decide whether they should be 
41 Suzanne Pepper gives an excellent summation of the problems facing the Communists 
as a result of the land reform campaign of 1946-1947. Much of the above was drawn 
from here assessment of the situation in Chapter 7 ofher text Civil War in China. 
42 By prominent news organs I am referring to the U.S Consulate General translations of 
newspaper articles in Shanghai, Beijing, Tientsin, Taiwan, and Nanjing. In addition to the 
print, translations of radio broadcasts from North Shensi Hsin Hua Station are also 
lacking a response. 
43 Shih Shih Hsin Pao, "We appeal on Behalf of the Rural Communities," Shanghai, June 
20, 1946 (CPR). 
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retained or discontinued.,,44 The media seemed to be advocating a political solution to the 
Kuomintang and Communist dispute, rather than reporting the actual events. They were 
politicizing the issue rather than dealing with the every day realities of land reform. The 
lack of coverage in the press suggests that the Nationalist government may have 
intentionally censored or suppressed reports pertaining to the most radical years of land 
reform. During my research it has occurred to me that there may have also been a 
selective process of translations by the United States so as to represent the Nationalist 
view rather than the successes of the Communists.45 
Land reform was actively being pursued across broad areas ofChina, and in the 
process it came to the attention of the Chinese Communist Party that certain errors and 
excesses existed in its implementation. The first reports of a need to alter the existing 
land reform policies, however, did not come from media reports ofCommunist tactics; 
rather, it stemmed from the internal summations of the Party. A shift in the land reform 
policies of the Communists can be detected unofficially in early 1947 and with more, 
official backing in late 1947. 
The National Land Conference that took place in September of 1947 had already 
recognized a need for change and called for a concerted Party rectification campaign. It 
acknowledged rightist errors and advocated a policy of rectification that centered on 
44 Wen Hui Pao, "What is Wrong with the Situation?" Shanghai, July 10, 1946 (CPR). 
45Support for this argument may be drawn from the United States reaction to the Dixie 
Mission. The Dixie Mission was a group ofUnited States soldiers sent to Yenan in 1944 
to see if the Communists had effective measures to defeat the Japanese. Their positive 
assessment ofCommunists strengths, including their land reform policies, prompted their 
prompt withdrawal from China and removal from their official military positions by the 
United States government. The U.S. pursued a specific agenda in China that was pro­
Chiang Kai-shek and anti-communist no matter what the circumstances were (Taken 
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reforming the work style of cadres and eliminating impurities in class composition that 
had resulted from the excesses of the first rectification campaign. Regional conferences 
were held and plans on how to engage in a second classification campaign were laid out. 
The Party took an approach in which errors within the party were subject to public 
criticism, beginning a trend in Communist rectification campaigns that would resurge 
again in party politics most notably in 1957.46 William Hinton notes that the rectification 
campaign of 1947 was characterized by 
careful preparation [that] made the second classification far more precise 
and scientific...with their newly acquired knowledge of the principles 
involved in class analysis, both cadres and peasants were able to probe 
more deeply than before into every aspect ofvillage affairs.47 
In December of 1947 Mao made a report before the Conference of the Central Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party addressing the current direction that the rural land 
reform movement needed to take. The speech was broadcast from the Communist Hsin 
Hua Station in North Shansi. He detailed the Party's policy and reiterated it was "to 'rely 
on the poor peasants, to consolidate our union with the middle peasants and to 
exterminate the feudalistic and semi-feudalistic exploitation system of the landed class 
from a class lecture [Hist. 300, Modem China] given by Dr. Thomas Lutze at Illinois 
Wesleyan University on March 12,2001). 
46party rectification would again be carried out under the banner of the Hundred Flowers 
Movement, in an attempt to open society to discussion, thought, and criticism. Mao had 
hoped to invoke large numbers ofpeople to discuss the weaknesses of the Soviet style in 
an attempt to generate enthusiasm for socialism and ultimately communism. This was 
followed by a series ofParty purges and rectification movements leading to the Cultural 
Revolution. 
47William Hinton, Fanshen: A Documentary ofRevolution in a Chinese Village, 
(Berkeley, CA: University ofCalifornia Press, 1966), 435. 
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and the old-style rich peasants.',48 On the heels of correcting rightist errors came a shift in 
policy in January of 1948 that focused on rectification of leftist deviations. This new 
policy seemed to be a fonnulation of ideas that had developed at different times in 
different provinces and coalesced in an official acknowledgement of Party error. Mao 
would later note that the problems had stemmed from 
the partial but fairly numerous encroachments on the interests of the 
middle peasants, the damage done to some private industrial and 
commercial enterprises and the overstepping in some places of certain 
lines of demarcation in the policy for suppressing counterrevolutionaries.49 
The encroachment on the rights of the middle peasants was seen as a fonnidable error. 
Concessions had to be made to the middle to broaden Communist support. 
Mao came out with an intra-party directive on January 18, 1947, which set the 
new guidelines for land refonn. He acknowledged that both rightist and leftist errors 
existed. Each deviation was to be addressed on the basis of the situation in which it 
thrived. Leftist errors now prevailed as the dominant concern of the party.50 One report 
from a Taiyuan paper, with a Nationalist military slant, indicated that the rectification 
campaign was "bloody struggles against wealthy villagers and landlords and Communist 
cadre members.,,51 Hinton's documentary included an account of the Party's rectification 
48 U.S. Consulate General, Peiping, China, "The Present Situation and the Tasks before
 
the Chinese Communists Party," in Translation Radio Broadcast o/Communist Hsin Hua
 
Station, North Shansi, January 3, 1948.
 
49Mao Tse-tung, "On the September Meeting-Circular ofthe Central Committee of the
 
Communist Party of China," Selected Works,5: 271.
 
50Mao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," Selected Works, Vol. 5.
 
51 Taiyuan Wan Pao (Gen. Yen His-shan), "Communist 'Struggles' increasingly violent,"
 
Peiping-Tientsin, January 22 1948 (CPR).
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campaign in rural areas. There were no reports ofbrutality in this phase of redistribution 
and once the rectification policies were begun, things reportedly ran smoothly.52 
The Central Committee issued another official policy, Directive on Land Reform 
and Party Rectification Work in the Old and Semi-old Liberated Areas, in February. The 
Directive modified Article Six of the Agrarian Law concerning the equality of land 
redistribution and maintained that the needs of the poor would still be the primary 
concern of the Party in areas where land reform had not been completed. Article 6 had 
originally stated "all land of landlords in the villages, and all public land...together with 
all other village land, in accordance with the total population of the village... shall be 
unifiedly and equally distributed.',s3 The revision of Article 6 included a provision 
protecting the rights of the rich and middle peasants ensuring "their houses and properties 
should not be touched," but their land could be confiscated to meet the needs of the 
poor.54 A more systematic guideline for conducting land reform was also set forth. The 
directive addressed how to handle redistribution in terms of varying types of property and 
what measures to take in areas were land had already been distributed. The Party 
maintained the rectification policy and broadened its span from the rural areas to include 
towns, factories, and various organizations. Upper level Party officials were entrusted 
with carrying out the campaign. 
52William Hinton's text Fanshen gives a detailed description of the rectification process
 
in parts IV and V.
 
53 Basic Program on Chinese Agrarian Law Promulgated by the Central Committee of the
 
Chinese Communist Party, 1947 as printed in Appendix A ofWilliam Hinton's text
 
Fanshen, 615-18.
 
54Supplementary Measures for Carrying Out the Basic Program on Agrarian Law, Draft
 
Promulgated by Hopei-Honan-Shansi-Shantung Border Region Government on Dec. 28,
 
1947, as printed in Appendix B ofWilliam Hinton's text Fanshen,619-22.
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The question of the middle peasants had been addressed and at least in areas 
where land reform had been accomplished a concerted effort to unify with the middle 
peasants had begun. Mao made a speech in April of 1948 that expanded upon the 
erroneous treatment of the middle peasants and that also acknowledged the success in the 
revolution would only come after the correction ofother serious errors that had taken 
place. The errors he outlined did not deal directly with the middle peasants; rather, they 
were "leftist" deviations focused mainly on encroachments made on landlords and rich 
peasants. In addition to these errors Mao commented on the notion of absolute 
equalitarianism. Mao noted 
[w]e support the peasants' demand for equal distribution ofIand in order 
to help arouse the broad masses ofpeasants speedily to abolish the system 
of land ownership by the feudal landlord class, but we do not advocate 
absolute equalitarianism. ... There is a kind of thinking now current in the 
countryside which undermines industry and commerce and advocates 
absolute equalitarianism in land distribution. Such thinking is reactionary, 
backward, and retrogressive in nature.55 
He justified his position by reiterating that this shift in policy was essential to the success 
of the Communist revolution. The policy line had not changed. In regards to agrarian 
reform, Mao stated that the Party will "rely on the poor peasants, unite with the middle 
peasants, abolish the system of feudal exploitation step by step and in a discriminating 
way, and develop agricultural production.',s6 The revolution's ultimate aim 
was the industrial transformation of society through the development of production, 
beginning with land reform. 
Mao pointedly commented that 
55 Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated
 
Area," Selected Works, 5: 235-6.
 
56Ibid., 235.
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[t]he development of agricultural production is the immediate aim of the 
land reform. Only by abolishing the feudal system can the conditions for 
such development be created. In every area, as soon a feudalism is wiped 
out and the land reform is completed, the Party and the democratic 
government must put forward the task of restoring and developing 
agricultural production, transfer all available forces in the countryside to 
this task, organize cooperation and mutual aide, improve agricultural 
technique, promote seed selection, and build irrigation works-all to ensure 
increased production....The abolition of the feudal system and the 
development ofagricultural production wi1llay the foundation for the 
development of industrial production and the transformation of an 
agricultural country into an industrial one.57 
The character and nature ofCommunist land reform was not only a social upheaval in 
the countryside, but one that had significant implications for urban industrialization and 
the modernization ofChina. The Communist's land reform policy would not shift again 
until after their victory against the Kuomintang. It is now important to address the 
Kuomintang response to calls for land reform and the Communist land reform policies 
and the general demands of the urban public in terms of an agrarian social revolution. An 
examination of the Nationalist's policies concerning land reform and their development 
and change in terms of the Communists policies was clearly portrayed in urban media. 
Both pro-Kuomintang and anti-Nationalist parties pleaded with the government to 
address the rural issue. 
The Kuomintang Response 
The agrarian problem had existed long before the onset ofWorld War II, dating 
back to the 1920's. Two arguments have generally prevailed in the assessment of the 
agrarian situation. The first emphasized the exploitative relationship between the 
landlords and the tenant farmers and in the urban and rural spheres of the economy; the 
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second argument focused on agricultural technology.58 The Kuomintang's land policy 
during World War II was non-existent. The government focused on resisting the 
Japanese before addressing the needs of the masses. A basic policy of rent reduction had 
been set forth in the Land Law of 1926. A more in depth policy was formulated in 1930, 
later to be revised to reduce rent further and eventually advocate the transfer of land to 
those who tilled it (the revision occurred in 1937). Ironically, ''between 1937 and 1942 
landlords increased their holdings in Szechuen from 65 to 70 per cent. .. [and] many 
corporations were organized in 'Free China' for the sole purpose of speculating land.'.59 
Little effort was made in the area of rent reduction. News articles printed in 1945 called 
for the Kuomintang to address the needs ofthe rural areas immediately. A Shanghai 
paper urged the 
Chinese Government to carry out, with a firm determination, a policy of 
agrarian reform so as to serve the purpose ofpost-war demobilization, 
instead ofbeing discouraged by the hindrances of such reactionary 
influences [reference to Communist land reform policies].6o 
The issue ofdemobilization seems to be the main concern of the author of this text, yet 
the mention of land reform as necessary, and reference to the Communists indicated that 
agrarian reform in reality and not just in concept was becoming a prominent issue. Many 
of the articles published in 1945 also indicated that the public hoped for peace and an end 
to all hostilities. A Kuomintang editorial published in December felt that "a black 
shadow had been cast by the problem of the Communists" and that it was necessary for 
57 Ibid., 237-8.
 
58Ramon H. Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Dev elopement in Hopei
 
and Shantung, 1880-1949, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 13-24.
 
59Lee, 26.
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them to concede to government demands and policies.61 This article went on to further 
discredit Communists policies by condemning the Communists phrase "liberated areas" 
in favor of the government view that the entire country was liberated by the Nationalist 
victory over Japan. The government had failed, however, to liberate the peasants by not 
aggressively pursuing land reform. 
The Kuomintang chose to advocate its rural policy following the end of the war 
and at a time when serious devastation in the countryside had already occurred. The 
nature of the rural situation was mentioned infrequently, but one article did address the 
devastation apparent in rural Hunan. It was reported that "in addition to this heavy 
[government] taxation, there is also famine, the decrease in labor available and the rise in 
food prices" making the phenomenon of "cheap land but expensive food" a harsh rural 
reality.62 The Kuomintang set forth its answer to these pleas for help at the Chinese 
Agricultural Association conference held in October of 1946. 
The 1946 Conference provided the opportunity for the KMT to publicly present 
its policies. The fundamental measures advanced by the KMT were "that improved 
techniques of agricultural production would solve China's problems in the 
countryside.,,63 The commitments to rent reduction and Sun's principle ofland to the 
tiller were set forth at an earlier meeting, the Political Consultative Congress in January 
of 1946 and again in the Government's 1946 Land Law. The convening of the Political 
60 Chien Sien Jie Pao, "Agrarian Reform as Solution," Shanghai, September 17, 1945
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62 Sin Wen Pao, "The Exhausted Rural Districts in Hunan" by Shih Yen, Shanghai, June
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Consultative Conference (PCC) seemed to make the concept of democratic rule more 
concrete with the decision on the part ofKMT, CCP, and minority party delegates to 
support a cease-fire. The Kuomintang was also urged to pursue a more active land 
reform policy by the United States. The U.S. issued a report calling for the abolition of 
tenancy along the lines set forth in the Nationalist Law. An editorial, in response to the 
China-United States agricultural mission, published in Shanghai in August 1946, noted "a 
prerequisite for agricultural development in China is the realization of democracy and the 
promotion oflocal self-government. .. [and a revision of] the policy ofa 25% reduction in 
rental rates.'M The failures within the government's land reform policy were realized 
within the first post-war year of their implementation. The tenancy reforms suggested by 
the U.S. agricultural specialist would go unheeded by the Nationalist government. 
The KMT land policy would vary little in concept as the civil war progressed, but 
the motivations and implementation of land reform would change significantly in 
response to the Communist land reform policies. The changes in Kuomintang policies 
and the motivations behind them are most clearly indicated in the urban press's response 
to the need for agrarian reform during the civil war years. 
A strong faith in the power of the Nationalist government to help the rural areas 
was evident in the first halfof 1946. A Kuomintang editorial appearing in January 
optimistically claimed that "we [the people] can infer that our government authorities are 
resorting to all possible amicable means in which to put an end to the internal strife" by 
64 Ho Ping Jin Pao, "How to Improve Chinese Agriculture," Shanghai, June 27, 1946 
(CPR). 
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having faith in the tasks set forth by Chiang Kai-shek in his New Year's Day address.65 
The article outlined the two main tasks as being the ''reconversion and relieving of the 
people from their sufferings... and secondly, to realize the democratic constitutional 
administration and restore political power to the people as soon as possible. 
The occupation of areas ofManchuria by Communist troops further aggravated 
the tense political situation and the question of land reform. An article in the 
Kuomintang newspaper, Ho Ping Jih Pao, indicated that 
after hearing the report made by President Chiang Kai-shek before the 
PPC session, the CP is fully aware that the Government and people 
definitely will not recognize the so-called "Democratic Joint Anny" and 
the ''popularly elected government',66 
that had been established in Manchuria. The Communist invasion ofManchuria 
indicated that the Chinese Communist Party was seeking to broaden its base of support 
and expand upon a policy for the Northeast that was outlined in Mao Tse-tung's essay 
"Build Stable Base Areas in the Northeast." Mao outlined a program in Manchuria that 
supported the basic Party line of arousing the support of the masses to struggle for and 
solve their problems, with the ultimate goal oflaying a foundation to defeat the 
Kuomintang.67 It is significant to note that this essay was written in December of 1945, 
prior to the PPC. The Kuomintang response to the Northeast issue was to accuse the 
Communists of"all kinds ofugly and stupid propaganda" and of trying to "split up the 
65 Chian Sian Jih Pao, "Minimum Requisites for Restoration of Political Power to the 
People," Shanghai, January 3, 1946 (CPR). 
66 Ho Ping Jih Pao, "Intrigue and Trickery ofCP," Shanghai, April 10, 1946 (CPR). 
67Mao Tse-tung, "Build Stable Base Areas in Northeast," Selected Works, 5: 81-5. 
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Northeast, [and] overthrow the National Government.,,68 The government failed to 
address the social issues that were being raised and fleshed out by the Communist forces. 
The Communists have also made evident at this point that negotiations for peace with the 
Kuomintang were not part of their political agenda. Most of the complaints that were 
generated from the CP's occupation ofManchuria came from KMT organs that 
politicized the issues rather than addressing the social revolution that was taking place in 
Communist controlled areas. The Chung Yang Jih Paa (KMT organ) concluded that the 
"Communists are bent on the total destruction of China.',69 These undocumented claims 
put the government in a position highly susceptible to criticism, and a shift in the urban 
response to government policies was evident by April of 1946. 
The Ha Ping Jih Paa, for example, had previously vested its interest in its faith in 
the government to provide effective relief for the agrarian sectors of China. An April 
publication of the same paper featured a definite shift in their views of the government. 
The article condemns the CNRRA, a government relief agency, for promising to supply 
peasants with an adequate means for survival but instead "their promise remains an 
uncashable check....[How is it that] in the Communist-controlled Central China Military 
District [people] can get large amounts of relief funds and supplies?,,7o Questioning the 
policies of the Kuomintang was becoming a popular theme in the urban press. 
Many of the attacks centered around the collection of land taxes in kind. One 
account ofthe collection ofland tax in the Wen Hui Paa, questioned why "the 
68Ha Ping Jih Paa, "Diagnosing the Mania of the CP," Shanghai, April 13, 1946 (CPR). 
69Chung Yang Jih Paa, "The New Offensives of the Communists," Nanjing, May 20, 
1946 (CPR). 
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Government has required the people to help as much as possible in the matter of the levy 
of farm tax in kind and of the purchase ofmilitary provisions" when the peasants are 
poverty stricken and bound by the surging interests rates?l The author would go so far as 
to say "all the measures taken by the Government have the peasants as the sole object of 
exploitation.,,72 At this point, when attacks against the Government were increasing, the 
Kuomintang had begun to pursue a military offensive against Communist Liberated 
Areas. 
In July of 1946 the Kuomintang attacked the Communists in Kiangsu. The 
Government forces moved "eastward [and] penetrated the hsien towns along the Grand 
Canal which bisected the Communists area.',73 The Kuomintang was able to take over 
many local administrations and reestablish government control. Kuomintang victory, 
however, came with a price. Initial reports of the Government offensive were 
characterized by claims that the generals and their troops were pursuing their own 
policies as opposed to the official guidelines set forth by Chiang and his officials. At the 
same time the Communists decided to abandon their retreat policy and launched a 
counter offensive that undermined the weak political policies in the KMT recovered 
74 
areas. 
Another formidable task facing the government grew out of the opposition that 
they faced in the rural areas. The almost non-existent implementation of rural land reform 
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by the Government had caused deep rifts within rural communities. Pepper summarizes 
an article in the Ta Kung Pao, a urban paper, that concluded "that the Government's only 
objective in its dispute with the CCP is to regain the power to govern; all else is left 
unattended.,,75 This seemed to support the earlier reports of the failings of the 
Kuomintang to address the needs of the people, and its primary concern with political 
victory. Similar accounts of the Government advance into the Hopei-Shantung-Honan 
area were also reported. It is significant to mention at this point that articles did appear in 
the urban press concerning the successful recovery of Communists occupied territories by 
KMT forces. Prevailing within these texts, however, was a definite call for the 
government to implement policies that are obviously drawn from Communists directives. 
An article in the Shanghai press reported that the peasants would be able to retain 
the right to till the land they had received from the Communists; the landowner, however, 
retained official rights to the property. This compromise was seen as the best solution, yet 
the conflicts that would naturally arise in implementing land to the tillers were not 
addressed.76 An article in the Wen Hui Pao concerning the recovered areas indicated the 
influence of Communist policies on Government tactics even more clearly. The author 
notes that "if real land reform is to be carried out, it must be clearly stipulated that a land 
lord may retain only the land which he tills himself... .It will be remembered that the 
equitable distribution of land and the principle of land to those who till it" are the pillars 
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of the Government's reform policies.77 This diverges from the official policies of the 
Kuomintang, which advocate technological advancements in the rural areas and some 
efforts at rent reduction. 
The aggression continued to escalate between the Kuomintang and the 
Communists, yet there were limited references to the crisis in the 1947 editions of the 
papers. The Chieh Jih Pao, a Kuomintang paper, briefly mentioned a "new" government 
land policy issued at the end of 1947 that called for "a 33 percent reduction in farm rent 
to counter Communist intrigues of land reformation.,,78 The article did not address the 
nature of the "intrigues". The author may have been referring to the shift in Communist 
policy that was taking place in regards to incorporating the needs of the middle peasants, 
some rich peasants, and even landlords in late 1947 and formally in January of 1948. One 
can assume that the efforts to implement this increase in rent reduction went unheeded, 
like the previous attempts at Government reform. A more noticeable shift in the 
Kuomintang's response to Communist policies is evident in the early months of 194~. 
Land reform was completely ignored by the press until April of 1948. Articles 
from the early part of the year were attacks against Mao Tse-tung with specific reference 
to his address "The Present Situation and Our Task." In response to Mao's essay the 
Chieh Jih Pao (KMT) newspaper characterized the policies of the Communists as a 
"dictatorship by a group of ruffians for democratic government and aggression through 
power politics for liberation." Mao's essay addressed the need to tum "back the wheel of 
counterrevolution- of U.S. imperialism and its lackey, the Chiang Kai-shek bandit 
77, Wen Hui Pao, "The Land and Monetary Problems Facing the 'Pacification Areas," 
Shanghai, October 25, 1946 (CPR). 
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gang... [and pursue the] extinction for Chiang Kai-shek's twenty-year counter­
revolutionary rule.,,79 He also stressed the need to reinforce the policy set forth in the 
October 1947 manifesto of the People's Liberation Army that included the call to 
unite workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen, all 
oppressed classes, all people's organizations, democratic parties, minority 
nationalities, overseas Chinese and other patriots; form a national united 
front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government; and 
establish a democratic coalition government.80 
This policy would be carried out through the land revolution, the subsequent increase in 
production, and the ultimate goal of industrialization. The policies hardly seem to 
indicate the use ofpower politics; rather they address the demands of the people for 
unification and social revolution. Mao was accused by Kuomintang organs of following 
"on the heels of Stalin in starting and organizing the Communist International in Europe 
by trying to set up a Communist International front of a like nature in Asia" with the 
ultimate goal of combining the twO.81 Mao, saw the New Democratic Revolution in 
China as an inspiration to oppressed nations and also as a tool of "assistance to the 
oppressed people now struggling in many countries in Europe and the Americas.',s2 But a 
formal call for a united Comintern was never made. In March the attacks against Mao 
and the Communist "bandits" continued, this time stressing the need to "scent out the 
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mainstay of the bandit forces and have it exterminated.''!!3 The main goal of the 
•
 
Government at this point seemed to have been the elimination of the Communists, with 
little focus on the elimination of social, political, and economic forces impeding the 
growth ofmodem China. 
The government aptly described their policy as opposite to the approach they 
took against the Japanese. Instead of "settlement of a military campaign [with the 
Communist Party and the risk of] international sympathy and support [being] reduced and 
weakened" if a settlement would have been reached, the Party sought to destroy the 
Communists without negotiations.84 The government openly acknowledged that it would 
have been more willing to settle with the Japanese, then with the Communists and would 
thus avoid the possible loss of foreign aide to the Nationalist government. Politics once 
again prevailed over the needs of the people as the prevalent theme ofKuomintang 
policy. Land reform would reemerge as a prominent issue in the middle of 1948 with the 
promulgation of a new approach by Kuomintang General Fu Tso-yi. 
General Fu Tso-yi theories concerning land reform marked a pivotal shift in the 
Kuomintang's implementation of their land reform policy. An editorial by the General in 
Ping Ming Jih Paa outlined the two tasks facing the Kuomintang government. The first 
was to attack the enemy; the second task was "consolidating our interior situation (or, to 
use shocking words, preventing a collapse from within).',s5 He called upon the 
government to address the needs of the people and then engage in an effort to mobilize 
83Peiping Jih Paa (Kuomintang),"1t is to 'Exterminate" the Bandits, Not to 'Prevent' the 
Bandits," Peiping-Tientsin, March 21, 1948 (CPR). 
84Ibid. 
85 Ping Ming Jih Paa (General Fu Tso-yi), "Striking Blows at the Enemy and 
Consolidating Our Interior Situation," Peiping-Tientsin, March 23, 1948 (CPR). 
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the masses to win the anti-Communist campaign. A realization on the part of some 
officials that the Communists were at least pursuing an effective strategy to meet the 
needs of the masses and mobilize in defense of their cause is apparent. 
The land problem was heralded as the preeminent issue facing the Government. 
Hsin Min Paa a pro-Kuomintang paper clearly stated, "the Communists Party had 
achieved ~uch success in handling the [land] problem.',s6 The land problem was essential 
and if dealt with successfully, the masses could be easily mobilized to support a military 
cause. General Fu Tso-yi apparently advocated a distinctly Chinese Communist policy of 
"restricting wealthy farmers, protecting middle-class farmers and assisting poor farmers" 
yet its implementation took on the distinct character of weak and shoddy leadership by 
Kuomintang officials.87 
The program called for two distinct policies, one for areas previously occupied by 
the Communists and another for those always under Government control. The program 
called for the recovery and redistribution of lands seized during the Communist struggles. 
All those who participated in the recovery of land would receive land and the amount 
they received would be 
according to actual requirements of individuals concerned...a reasonable 
equalization of land properties shall be sponsored [including land not 
affected by the struggle movement]. Last of all the government shall 
purchase (surplus) land and reallocate it [and] a cooperative production 
method shall be adopted in the redistributed farms.8 
86 Hsin Min Paa (Pro-Kuomintang) "The Solution of the Land Problem," Peiping­
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The policy in areas where the Communist presence was not felt would still pursue rent 
reduction with the ultimate aim ofredistribution. The land program also stipulated that to 
receive property you had to participate in the recovery movement and help to suppress 
Communist forces. Anyone "who after the recovery of the locality" is still willing to 
"collaborate and work for the bandits will have their land properties and other assets 
confiscated.',s9 The foundation of the General's concept bears a strong resemblance to 
Communist policies, both in its aim ofland distribution and the means through which 
they sought to mobilize the poor, middle, and wealthy peasants. 
An article that appeared in Cheng Yien Pao a Kuomintang backed paper, actually 
advocated a socialist revolution. It noted that 
[a] unique feature ofthe Chinese Revolution is that, while it want [sic] to 
develop Capitalism, it aims also at bypassing Capitalism and achieving 
Socialism. The only effective means of solving this self-contradiction 
consists of State ownership of industries, limitation ofcapital, and 
equitable distribution ofland advocated by the late Dr. Sun Yat­
sen....Therefore, if the Kuomintang wants to restore its original character 
which it had in the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen's days .. .it must carry out, not just 
a Capitalist democratic revolution, but rather a Socialist proletarian 
revolution. If it wants to do so, it must represent the interests of the mass 
of laborers and farmers first, and its social basis must be the laborers and 
farmers.9o 
It calls upon the Kuomintang to transcend social and class distinctions and become the 
party that can incorporate all areas in to a unified revolution. The Communist Party in 
China had been pursuing this policy during the anti-Japanese war as well as intensifying 
its efforts to promote a socialist revolution during the years immediately following the 
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defeat of the Japanese. The shift ofCommunist policy in 1949 to addressing the needs of 
the cities marked the incorporation of a successful rural movement into the overall plan 
for revolution. The suggestion for a proletariat revolution on the part ofKuomintang 
supporters suggested a concession to the victory of the Communist cause, in terms of 
what it had accomplished while the civil war was going on. 
Official Kuomintang policy varied little from its initial tasks as set forth in their 
1937 Land Law. A noted shift in the necessity of land reform as a tool for winning the 
revolution is evident, however, as the war progresses. Communist polices were 
addressed and adapted to meet the political needs of the Kuomintang in a last ditch 
attempt to maintain political power. The middle forces played a significant role in the 
ultimate defeat of the Kuomintang and in the promulgation of public sentiment that 
suggested the Government was failing. An examination of the role of the middle forces 
and their responses to rural land reform will provide the final component of the response 
that the land reform movement generated in the cities. 
The Middle Forces Respond 
The middle forces in China represent the interests of a variety of political forces 
that have developed ideologies and risen to a certain level of public stature. The 
Republican Period ofChina (1912-1927) saw the rise and fall of a variety of interest 
groups and marked the beginning of the development ofmore sound political groups. It 
is in this era that the 
the fires of radical youth protest associated with the New Culture 
Movement of 1915 and the May Fourth Movement of 1919 conjoined with 
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the inspiration of the Bolshevik Revolution to give rise in 1921 to the birth 
of the Chinese Communists party.91 
In addition to the Communist Party, the China Youth Party, and the "Third Party" that 
grew out of the Kuomintang in 1927 were significant political players. Other 
organizations ofprominence would evolve and such parties as the: All-China General 
Trade Union, the Chinese Anti-Imperialist/Anti-Fascist League, and the Shanghai Labor 
Group Coalition appeared in the mid- 1930's. Under the banner of resistance to Japan 
these groups were able to demand, "armed resistance to Japan based on mobilization of 
the Chinese people [and] the formation of an All-China Committee for National 
Defense,,92 It is evident that the ideas set forth in this policy are indicative of early 
attempts of the Communist Party to align with the middle forces. 
Japanese aggression and failed efforts to pacify the divisions between the 
Communists and the Nationalists only intensified the concerns of the middle forces, who 
had hoped to utilize the peaceful coexistence of both groups as a means to express their 
political ideologies. The need for an organized body though which to expound on their 
ideas led several minority parties to organize the United National Construction League 
(UNCL) in 1939.93 From the outset the UNCL had the backing of the Communist Party 
because of its aims in resisting Japan and forming a democratic coalition style 
government. Attempts by the UNCL to mediate the Kuomintang- Communist disputes 
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only met with failure, and prompted the fonnation of the Federation of Chinese 
Democratic Parties in March of 1941. 
The Federation outlined ten points all of which coalesced around "resistance [of 
Japan] to the end...end to one-party control over the State...establish real unity... [and] to 
protect the legitimate expression ofpublic opinion.,,94 The policies advocated by the 
Federation spread in both influence and range of support. In September of 1944 to meet 
the growing demands of China's democratic elements the Federation made membership 
open to individuals and changed its name to the Chinese Democratic League. The CCP 
and League shared many of the same aims and their ideas converged in the policies set 
forth in Mao's "On Coalition Government." 95 
The Democratic League would be the most important group that the Chinese 
Communist Party sought as an ally. Their independent character and inclusion of 
students, businessmen, and intelligencia made them an invaluable source when the 
Communists pursued the ultimate goal of a socialist revolution of the proletariat in the 
cities. Other groups and individuals did exist, however, and were also essential to the 
Communist's plan for revolution. The other political parties represented a variety of 
interest groups, laborers, scientists, and intellectuals. These organizations "served to 
spread the influence of the DL. ...They also offered their leaders a platfonn from which 
they might speak and act independently of the League.',96 These groups would take on a 
more significant role when the Democratic League was disbanded by the Kuomintang. In 
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addition to these groups, the opinions ofnon-Communist and non-Nationalist individuals 
also had an impact on the role of the middle forces. One such individual was 
anthropoligist Fei Xiaotong. 
Fei was a western trained scholar who was best known for his illuminating book 
on life in a Chinese village, his reports on the development of agriculture and industry in 
southwest China, and a several articles addressing the gentry in Chinese society. A series 
of articles written by Fei in 1947 and 1948 to urban newspapers suggested his concern 
over the condition of China's agrarian system and the methods through which he felt the 
land issue could be resolved. 
Fei's essay, Rural Livelihood: Agriculture and Handicraft, addressed the 
importance of a strong rural economy in terms of the economy and in fostering a 
productive relationship between the cities and the countryside. Fei noted that "[w]hen 
one comes to examine the economic decline of the country, what strikes one most 
forcefully is the system by which tenant farming is carried on.'B7 He aptly assed the 
tenant landlord relationship as one that exploited the tenant farmer and forced peasants to 
"find other sources of income or go into debt.,,98 The entire system ofhired labor and 
tenant farming reflected a lack of organization and bad cultivation techniques. 
To solve the agrarian crisis, Fei advocated redistribution of land. Although the 
farmers' holdings would only increase minutely, Fei felt that ''the farmers ...could live 
fairly well on what they themselves produced," without having to pay rent.99 He noted 
96yan Slyke, 191. 
97Fei. 110. 
98Ibid., 112. 
99Ibid., 113. 
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that land redistribution did not address the larger issue ofoverpopulation in the rural 
areas, however, it did provide for a minimum standard of well-being and dependence. 
Fei's observations stemmed not only from the emphasis on land reform during the civil 
war, but also from his own investigation into the rural economy of Yunnan. Prior to his 
statements concerning land reform in 1946, Fei had noted that the 
natural environment is so poor that agriculture cannot provide them with a 
livelihood...the distribution ofwealth is not even. There are rich people 
who possess a larger share of the income from the land. Therefore, the 
actual deficiency from many of the households [is substantial]. 100 
Fei's report acknowledged that an overhaul ofthe agrarian system was necessary 
not only for the social welfare of the rural people, but also for the growth of a 
modern economy. Fei's contribution as a voice ofthe middle forces was 
significant and helped to lend credence to the Communist policies. 
The response of the middle forces to the land reform policies of the Communists 
made an impact on the success of the revolution both in the countryside, but more 
significantly in the cities. An examination of the urban responses to land reform by the 
minority parties will complete the analysis of the urban response in general, provide an 
analysis of the democratic elements positions and ideologies, and make evident how each 
group sought to politicize their own agenda. Ultimately, the policies advocated by most 
middle groups aligned well with the advancements made by the Communists, thus 
securing the Communist defeat of the Kuomintang. It is important to realize, however, 
that the political ambitions ofthe middle forces were never fully put aside and unity 
politically was not advocated. The most important issue became the common elements 
46 
drawn from each party's policies and how they accentuated what the Communists were 
actually accomplishing. 
The earliest documentation of a middle force response to the civil war called for a 
settlement to the Kuomintang and Communist disputes and it came in 1945 from the 
Democratic League. It was evident in the early stages of the civil war that the League 
advocated that the "[p]olitical administration in China...must be democratized in order to 
live up to the unanimous anticipations of the people."IOI There was no mention ofland 
reform in 1945 on the part ofmost of the middle forces. Yet the concept of a united 
government that addressed the varying needs of the people, had been advocated by the 
Communists as well. Mao's "On Coalition Government" established the basis for 
unifying with minority parties by acknowledging that 
an urgent need exists beyond all doubt for representatives of all political 
parties and groups ofpeople without party affiliation to unite and establish 
a provisional democratic coalition government so as to carry out 
democratic reforms...thereby defeating the Japanese aggressors and 
liberating the Chinese people from their clutches.102 
Thus the early focus on political unity rather than sustentative social issues was not an 
attempt to bypass the needs of the people, as indicated by some of the Kuomintang's 
responses, but rather an attempt to form a political system to address the needs of the 
people without war. Many parties, like the Democratic League, focused on the political 
issues of the time and predominantly the need to settle the Kuomintang/Communist 
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disputes. Politically the motivation behind these responses is also an attempt by the 
middle forces to gain strength and support in their own right. A report from the 
vernacular press noted that the Communist Party's support of the Three People's 
Principles was ''tactic recognition of the fact that the Kuomintang is a central guiding 
influence... and that they themselves will be willing to participate... as a minor political 
party.,,103 This response, as well, indicated that the primary concern of the middle forces 
was a political resolution yet this author seems to advocate the Kuomintang as the 
superior political party. 
Additional calls for the Communist Party to withdraw from conflict, in favor of 
Nationalist rule, came from a citizen organization, and were reported in the Republican 
Daily News. The organization claimed 
those who attempt to break the national unification and to hinder the task 
of reconstruction will no doubt be abandoned and disliked by the people. 
At the moment when the Central Government is starting the work of 
rehabilitation...we earnestly hope that you will give up your prejudices 
and will stop attacking actions and cooperate with the Central 
Government.104 
The need to end to all hostilities permeated the press at this time as well, indicating the 
exhausted state of affairs following the war of anti-Japanese aggression. A shift in the 
nature ofthe articles by the middle forces, however, was evident in late May of 1946. 
Addressing the politics of the parties was complimented by an effort to tackle the more 
real and concrete needs of the people. 
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An article that appeared in the Emancipation Journal ofMay 25, 1946 made a 
direct and outright attack on the government's land policies. It noted that 
a comparison of the robbery of land by corrupt Kuomintang officials and 
the gratis distribution of land taken over by the Northeast democratic 
government to the poor farmers and hired workers on the farms will 
clearly show who is actually working for the benefit and welfare of the 
people. 105 
The rural land reform policies of the CCP and the democratic governments in the 
Northeast had definitely made an impression on the middle forces and highlighted the 
deficiencies in the Government's own policies. Calls to settle the Kuomintang and 
Communist dispute continued in 1946 yet this time they were characterized by distaste 
for the Nationalist government. An independent paper, Hsin Min Wan Pao, called for the 
opposing parties "to settle their differences, they should take into consideration the hopes 
and desires of the people...the party in power has paid little attention to the people's 
hopes and desires."lo6 The need to focus on social issues was again made evident by the 
minority factions. A profound call to address the needs of the people was set forth in 
August of 1946 by the China Land Society. 
The China Land Society's Chairman of the Board ofDirectors, Hsiao Cheng, set 
forth a guide for land reform that was published in the Ta Kung Pao (Shanghai). The 
policy called for a democratic government, but to achieve true unity it was necessary to 
engage in all out land reform. Article 3 called for adherence to Sun's principles of those 
who till the land shall own it and outlined seven steps for insuring its implementation. 
105The Emancipation Journal, "Who is Exploiting the People?" Peiping-Tientsin, May 25, 
1946 (CPR). 
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The plan was set forth as follows: (1) all land (bought, sold, or received as a gift) must 
be tilled by the owner; (2) land not tilled by the owner is to be requisitioned by the 
government; (3) once requisitioned that land should be divided into farms and given to 
peasants to till; (4) the land must be paid for in increments over a 15-20 year period; (5) 
land loan certificates can be claimed for goods or their equivalent in money; (6) land loan 
certificates may be bought and sold, as well as exchanged for stock in government run 
companies; (7) all redistributed land should be managed under co-operative farms.107 
The plan set forth a basic outline to carry out land reform in a manner that would 
ease the transition from a feudal agrarian economy. The plan also outlined the economic 
and political implications that a thorough land reform policy would bring about noting, 
"actual participation in politics by farmers should be achieved at the same time as land 
reform. And land reform will become the basis for the achievement ofpermanent national 
unification and true democracy in this country.,,108 The realization that land reform was 
necessary and a vital element to the revolution had become more apparent as the lan4 
reform campaign of the Communists intensified. Significant to note is that the China 
Land Society seems to have been a pro-Kuomintang middle force. Little information 
pertaining to the nature and ideologies of the Society was available, but a note at the end 
of the article mentioned that Hsiao Cheng was a close friend of Chen Kuo-fu, Vice-
Minister of Economic Affairs. Regardless of their political orientation the Society made 
a profound appeal on behalf of the rural areas. 
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In the course of assessing the middle forces role in influencing the opinion of the 
people, an interesting article appeared in the Sin Wen Pao, advocating the "third parties" 
to enlarge. The article called upon the middle forces to enlarge their scope as well as 
their efforts to include "the real Third Parties [which] are the people, the people 
throughout the country."I09 Advocating including the people in party affairs followed 
uniformly with the principles of democratic government. However, the article also called 
upon the Communist Party to realize "the true wishes of these Third Parties-the people 
throughout the country... [who] can no longer tolerate such a farce as the Communist-
sponsored 'People's Assembly."l1o This attack against the Communist party mirrored an 
earlier attack made against the Kuomintang by the same news organ.III It is unclear as to 
which party this paper is affiliated with, the only consistent ideology it pursued was 
maintaining and improving the rights of the people. Another organization that promoted 
the civil rights of the masses was the China Peasant Party. 
The China Peasant Party issued its manifesto in May of 1947. The six-point , 
manifesto began with the primary goal of the Party "to win for the peasants status of 
master of the country, and to labor for political reforms as well as agricultural and rural 
improvements."lI2 Once again solving political disputes is the main focus, yet the 
obvious inclusion of land reform by a Peasant Party suggested that it saw a solution to the 
rural problem as necessary to attain a friendly political environment. The Party does 
make mention of its solution to the rural issue, with a pointedly anti-Communist flavor: 
I09Sin Wen Pao, "Enlarge the Third Parties," Shanghai, October 19, 1946 (CPR). 
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It is our opinion that the way to improve rural economy is to lay stress on 
political reforms and on the enforcement of law and order so that the 
wealth and production of the farmers will not be illegally exploited no be 
concentrated in cities. At the same time, this does not mean to rob the rich 
farmers or petty landowners for the benefits of the poor peasants....Our 
first effort will be to enable the peasants... [and] through their own 
industry and economy, they may gradually improve their living 
conditions. I 13 
It can be concluded that the China Peasant Party represented the interests ofwealthy 
peasants and small landlords, rather than the middle and poor peasants. Its attack on 
distributing land to the poor is an open criticism of CCP practices, yet they offer no 
viable solution to the problems that faced the poor who comprised most of the peasant 
class. 
How peasant industry and economy were developed and incorporated the needs of 
the poor is hastily brushed over in favor of advocating a policy that promoted production 
and industry. One must ask, how was the growth ofproduction and industry possible 
without establishing a base for its growth? The Communists proposed and carried out a 
solution to the rural issue that allowed for industry and production to eventually flourish; 
addressing the needs of the poor peasants first and then unifying with the middle peasants 
and ultimately the rich peasants ensured that the Communist plan for production would 
succeed. 
A significant gap in available material regarding the response generated by the 
middle forces in the cities is evident following the June 1947 publication of the above-
mentioned article. The next media report concerning the views of the third parties came 
112 Ta Kung Pao (Independent, Political Science Group), "China Peasant Party Issues 
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in January 1949. There was no suggestion in the newspapers that I analyzed as to why 
the middle forces' opinions were being omitted, but one can logically assume that the 
Kuomintang's restriction on the media in the last years of the civil war was responsible. 
On October 27, 1947 "the decision was taken to outlaw the [Democratic] League as 
accessory to the 'Communist bandits' .,,114 This in effect silenced the minority parties who 
had often used the League as a base from which to voice their ideologies and political 
agendas. 
The resurgence ofnews coverage of the middle forces came in 1949, albeit on a 
very limited scale. Two articles that appeared in the Yi Shi Pao ( a Catholic news 
organ)in January of 1949 were the only evidence that minority parties existed until the 
end ofthe civil war.1l5 On January 19, 1949 an editorial was published in a Shanghai 
paper that expounded upon the ideas set forth by Chinese Catholics.116 The poor are the 
focus of the article and 
are truly the 'innocent people' who fonn the majority of the population. 
Yet these poor people are continuously being subjected to exploitation, 
oppression, threats, trickery and sacrifice. They are used as the tools for 
the struggle for poor, and at the same time are the objects of the fight for 
control. 117 
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The article continued by accentuating the horrible conditions that the poor are subjected 
to and the corruption and inefficiencies that characterized the Government. The 
Communist's policies in the liberated areas are also mentioned (though the writer 
acknowledges that "our personal experience is lacking") and condemned as nothing more 
than "human-sea tactics ... [and] a 'final reckoning' policy [that makes] many 
unreasonable changes in the social system, in the mode ofliving and in moral 
conceptions.,,118 The concerns of the Church were that the civil war has made it difficult 
for it to proselytize. The Church's undocumented and unfounded criticisms of the 
Communists give the Church little credibility as being an unbiased source through which 
the people can be liberated. 
A follow up article outlined eight demands of the people as interpreted by the 
Catholic Church and addressed land reform as being one of the principle means through 
which harmony could be realized. The Church advocated that basic civil liberties were a 
necessary component to peace. However, they feel that the "existing social order, 
including the family system, the present moral and ethical codes, must not be changed,,119 
It is unclear as to how the tumultuous situation in China could be pacified by the Church 
without making a significant social upheaval. The mere suggestion in article seven of the 
Church's policies that the "principle of 'land to the tiller' must be realized" implicated a 
radical change in the existing social order.120 Despite the anti-Communist rhetoric of the 
Catholic Church, the realization that land reform was necessary and that the principle of 
land to the tillers should be realized indicated that the land reform program of the 
118Ibid. 
119 Yi Shih Pao (Chinese Catholic Organ), "Whether in War or Peace, the People's 
Demands Must be Considered," Shanghai, January 20, 1949 (CPR). 
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Communist Party had made an impression. The demands set forth in the article were the 
last indication by a middle force in the newspapers that I examined that felt land reform 
was necessary. 
It is evident, even this late in the revolution that the struggle for prevailing 
political ideologies was still being waged. Ultimately, the middle forces saw as the only 
- means to end the war indirectly, if not emphatically, the land reform policies set forth by 
the Communists. Mao's call for a coalition government inspired the third parties to 
support the party that would hopefully allow them to attain political independence. 
The middle forces, regardless of their political aims were necessary components 
of the revolution to assure Communist victory. Thomas Lutze appropriately concludes 
that 
politically these forces were an important part of the destabilization of the 
Nationalist government from within its own urban 
strongholds....Economically, they were to playa critical role immediately 
in the maintenance ofproduction to support the revolution. 121 
It is evident by the responses the middle forces generated in the urban press that they 
were a prominent factor in destabilizing the Kuomintang control of the cities. Their open 
criticisms ofKuomintang policies and their realization that the policies being pursued by 
the Communists were turning over the existing social order, albeit not exactly as they 
would have done it, marked a turning point in the civil war and ensured that the 
revolutionary spirit magnified by the Chinese Communist Party was leading China in a 
positive direction. 
12°Ibid. 
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In March of 1949 Mao Tse-tung formally announced a shift in Communist policy 
that ended the focus on the rural areas. The statement was issued in his report to the 
Second Plenary Session at the Seventh Central Committee meeting. Mao concluded that 
"[t]he period of 'from the city to the village' and of the city leading the village has now 
_	 begun.... The center of gravity of the Party's work had shifted from the village to the 
city.,,122 Having accomplished the goal ofmobilizing the peasants, the Communist Party 
saw its opportunity to mobilize the workers and lead the revolution of the proletariat. 
The Party was faced with a difficult task, one that required the Party itself to urbanize and 
adapt what it had accomplished in the countryside to what needed to be done in the cities. 
Although the countryside accounted for nearly eighty percent of the population, the cities 
contained the vital elements for production to flourish and for a socialist revolution to 
unfold. This task was made somewhat easier by what the Party had accomplished in the 
countryside through the land reform movement. 
Land reform had abolished the feudal system of agriculture and made possible the 
overthrow of the rural elite. By destroying the political and economic power of the local 
landlord class, the Communist Party laid the foundation for a new order to emerge. 
Communist policies and ideologies were thus able to permeate the masses and provided 
the base from which the Communist Party could draw upon for political and military 
support. While struggling with rural issues the Party always maintained that ultimately 
121Lutze, Thomas D, "The Battle for the Middle Forces: United States Relations with the
 
Chinese Communist Party 1947-1948," 47.
 
122 Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central
 
Committee." Selected Works, 5:363.
 
56 
the proletariat would lead the revolution and the peasant masses would provide the 
•
 
support needed to accomplish the revolution. It was in light of these goals that the urban 
response to the rural land reform movement was significant. 
It is evident that all political factions that existed during the civil war realized the 
significance of land reform and what it meant both in terms of a social revolution and 
political power. The theme that prevailed in the urban responses to land reform focused 
more on the political implications of land reform and more specifically how each party 
could utilize the land reform movement to gain a popular base of support. 
The Kuomintang addressed the rural social crisis with the popular slogan 'land to 
the tiller', but in actuality scant attention was focused on the masses. The primary goal of 
the Government was the elimination of the Communists. It was not until the policies of 
the Communist Party in the rural areas began to take hold and uproot the old ruling order 
that the Kuomintang realized that mobilizing the masses was necessary if they were to 
going to maintain political control. By the time the Government made an effort to , 
address rural issues, they had already become an ineffective ruling body for the masses. 
One can note the sharp changes in the implementation of the Kuomintang land 
reform policies that bear a strong resemblance to the practices already being implemented 
in the Communist liberated areas. The urban response, both pro-Kuomintang and anti­
Kuomintang, indicated that the social revolution that had begun under the leadership of 
the Communists was necessary for both the growth ofmodem China and for the control 
of the government. Urban journalists called upon the Kuomintang to address the needs of 
the masses to alleviate the economic and social burdens they were facing and pro­
Kuomintang papers also saw the need for the Government to maintain political control of 
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the country. As the political crisis facing the Kuomintang deepened, a shift in the urban 
response, even on the part ofKuomintang organs is noticeable, as the cries for democracy 
and political unity overshadow the call for the Government to maintain control. 
The middle forces had little influence as far as implementing policy and practice 
are concerned yet their opinions and support were necessary for either the Kuomintang or 
the Chinese Communist Party to win the war. From the outset, the middle forces had 
been recognized as a key component of the Communist victory over the Kuomintang. 
The Communist Party had consistently advocated a coalition government and thus 
secured the cooperation ofmost minority parties and most significantly the Democratic 
League. The Kuomintang, however, made little effort to cooperate with the middle 
forces and was responsible for their suppression during the later half of the civil war. It is 
evident in the middle forces responses to the land reform movement that they were fed up 
with the Kuomintang and its failed attempts at social, political, and economic reform. 
The middle forces saw a chance to establish themselves as strong, independent polit~cal 
organizations by following on the heels of the Communist Party's practice of efficient 
politics and mobilization of popular support. 
Although Communist ideologies were not always consistent with those advocated 
by the middle forces, the accomplishments made by the Communist Party were far 
greater than those by the Kuomintang, thus solidifying the middle forces hope for a 
coalition government. The middle forces also carried a significant amount of influence in 
terms of popular opinion, in particular those of the intelligencia, businessmen, students, 
and professionals, who comprised most of their organizations. Thus maintaining their 
support was critical for Communist victory. 
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The urban response to the rural land reform movement indicated that the Chinese 
Communist Party was effective in influencing the opinions ofKuomintang officials, anti­
Government organs, and the middle forces. Although the ideologies and practices of the 
Communists were not always consistent with the goals ofurban forces, the 
accomplishments they made had a significant impact on their influence in the cities. The 
urban newspapers saw land reform as an opportunity to politicize their own agenda, 
maintain their own identities and strive for internal peace. The actualization of land 
reform and the implementation of rural land policies by the Chinese Communist Party 
sparked a vigorous response across all fronts and forced a convergence of ideas as to 
whether once land reform was accomplished, which party would be able to maintain 
control. It is in that regard that one can conclude why the Communist Party was able to 
maintain control. They organized, implemented and successfully carried out a rural land 
reform movement that abolished the old order and laid the base from which their political 
ideologies could grow, thus maintaining their independence and broadening their bas,e of 
support. 
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